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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation introduces three essays on public economics with a focus on the developing 
country setting. The first two essays present evidence that the accountability generated by electoral 
institutions positively affects government performance. The last essay shows that exposure to inter-
group conflict has lasting effects on the degree to which individuals favor members of their in-group. 
All three essays use data from the Philippines. 
In the first essay, “The impact of election fraud on government performance,” I study the 
effects of an election reform that happened in the Philippines in 2010. Using data on election results 
for mayor, I show that it reduced election fraud regardless of the pre-existing level of election fraud. 
I find that the reduction in election fraud caused building permit approvals to increase by 15 percent. 
Since delays in granting approvals are associated with bribe requests, this increase implies a 
significant improvement in government performance. 
In the second essay, “Does electoral pressure lead to better government performance?,” I 
study whether increased electoral pressure can increase the effort government officials put into their 
tasks. To measure effort, I use province-level data on the fraction of the affected population 
evacuated to prepare for tropical cyclones. This isolates effort because resources are pre-positioned 
and provided by national government agencies. I find that governors who face re-election incentives 
increase evacuations by twenty percentage points. 
In the third essay, “Does conflict exposure increase in-group bias? Evidence from 
experiments in the Philippines,” we exploit community-level exposure to two types of conflict that 
exist in the Philippines: a Muslim separatist movement and a communist insurgency. We merge data 
on community-level conflict exposure with information about giving to partners of different religion 
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or ethnicity measured using experimental games. Our results indicate that Muslims exposed to the 
inter-religious conflict become more biased against other Muslims, while being exposed to the 
indiscriminate communist conflict leads to opposite effects. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
To design effective public policy, it is necessary to obtain both an accurate understanding 
of existing problems as well as the effectiveness of various policy interventions. In this 
dissertation, I study the lasting effects of conflict exposure on social norms regarding bias, which 
helps explain why countries recover differently following civil conflict. I also provide causal 
evidence that reducing election fraud and increasing electoral pressure both generate significant 
improvements in government performance.  
 Section 2 studies the causal effects of an election reform in the Philippines on economic 
and political outcomes. In 2010, the Philippines switched to using voting machines to count 
ballots instead of by hand. Because the new system was more secure and faster at generating 
results, election fraud became much harder to commit. Using newly-developed forensic 
measures of election fraud, I show that this reform drove election fraud in mayoral elections 
down to undetectable levels, regardless of the pre-existing level of election fraud. Leveraging 
this as-good-as random variation in election fraud, I then examine the effect on building permit 
approvals. This is a useful measure of mayoral performance since the permitting process is 
directly controlled by mayors and building permit approvals are a leading indicator of economic 
activity (Berman, Felter, Kapstein, and Troland, 2013). My main result is that the reduction in 
election fraud caused a 15 percent increase in the number of building permits approved each 
year. In addition to this, I estimate a substantial erosion in incumbent victory margins, without an 
accompanying decrease in their likelihood of winning re-election. This pattern of results 
indicates that the effect on performance may have worked through an increase in the electoral 
pressure felt by incumbents. 
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 In Section 3, I directly examine this idea by specifically asking whether increases in 
electoral pressure, due to the salience of upcoming elections, causes governors to exert more 
effort when conducting mass evacuations in preparation for tropical cyclones. This performance 
measure directly captures effort, as all the necessary resources are provided by the national 
government and governors need only to coordinate evacuation efforts within their province. 
Since governors become ineligible to seek re-election after serving three consecutive terms, I can 
use variation in electoral pressure generated by these term limits and the time to the next 
election. Specifically, since upcoming elections do not increase pressure on ineligible governors, 
I identify the causal pathway by comparing how evacuations change as elections approach in 
provinces headed by eligible governors relative to provinces headed by ineligible governors. 
Results indicate that increased pressure from upcoming elections causes a 20 percentage point 
increase in the fraction of affected population evacuated. Robustness exercises indicate that this 
effect grows as elections draw closer and fades when elections are farther away. 
 Section 4 studies the effect of conflict exposure on the institution of fairness to religious 
in-group counterparts. With Catherine Eckel, Katerina Sherstyuk, Rick Wilson, Natalia Candelo, 
Sun-Ki Chai, and Debbie Gundaya, I use data gathered from previous studies to examine how 
conflict exposure affects religious bias in the Philippines. Understanding how conflict can have 
lasting effects on exposed individuals is important, especially as it affects the type of behavior 
that matters for economic development. To study this, we exploit as-good-as-random 
community-level exposure to two types of conflict that exist in the Philippines: a Muslim 
separatist movement and a communist insurgency. We merge data on community-level conflict 
exposure with information about giving to partners of different religion or ethnicity. Our results 
indicate that Muslims exposed to the inter-religious/ethnic conflict become more biased against 
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other Muslims, while being exposed to the indiscriminate communist conflict leads to opposite 
effects. This implies that the nature of the civil conflict, together with the identities of the groups 
involved, interact with each other to mediate the effect on bias. Public policies designed to foster 
unity after civil conflict would benefit from taking this into account. 
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2. THE IMPACT OF ELECTION FRAUD ON GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 
2.1 Introduction 
 The promise of democracy is that it allows voters to hold government accountable for 
their performance (Adsera, Boix, and Payne, 2003; Barro 1973; Ferejohn, 1986).  However, 
when election outcomes can be manipulated via fraud, government officials may no longer have 
an incentive to perform or respond to their constituents’ needs. Worse, elected officials may 
engage in corrupt behavior that inhibits economic growth, such as exploiting bureaucratic red 
tape to exact bribes from firms. This lack of electoral accountability perhaps explains why, 
despite the rise of democratic institutions around the world, corruption and poor government 
performance remain persistent problems, especially in developing countries (Olken and Pande, 
2012; Svensson, 2003). Poor government performance caused by unnecessary red tape and 
corruption has been shown to significantly inhibit economic development through their effect on 
discouraging investment (Mauro, 1995; Meon and Sekkat, 2005; Fisman and Svensson, 2007; 
World Bank Group, 2016). This section focuses on the question of whether reducing election 
fraud and restoring electoral accountability results in improved government performance. 
 Despite the intuitive appeal of linking election fraud to government performance, to my 
knowledge there has been no evidence demonstrating the causal pathway.  This is largely 
because research on the impact of election fraud has been hampered by a lack of election fraud 
measures and settings in which there is demonstrable election fraud. Important exceptions to the 
absence of work on elections and its relationship with government performance include Ferraz 
and Finan (2008 and 2011). They exploit data on corruption constructed from publicly released 
expenditure audit reports to identify the effect of reported corruption on electoral outcomes, as 
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well as the effect of reelection incentives on corruption practices of incumbent politicians. 
Importantly, however, these studies focus on Brazil, a country whose elections are not marred by 
election fraud (Fujiwara, 2015). The purpose of this section is to complement this small but 
important literature by being the first to estimate the impact of election fraud on economic 
growth-inhibiting behavior by government. 
 It does so by using data from an election reform in the Philippines.  The Philippines is a 
developing country in East Asia whose elections have long been perceived to be fraudulent 
(Schaffer, 2005). Beginning in 2010, the Philippines switched from manual to automated 
elections. Relative to the slow and vulnerable manual election system, which on average required 
about six weeks to generate official results (Mugica, 2015), the automated election system was 
expected to reduce election fraud in several ways.  Specifically, the reform was designed to 
reduce election fraud committed during counting and canvassing by decreasing the time needed 
to generate official results from six weeks to one, and also by introducing security and 
transparency features that make it difficult to successfully change election results after the fact.  
To identify the effect of election fraud on government performance, I exploit the 
differential impact of the election reform across regions in the Philippines that arises because all 
towns were assigned to use the automated election system in 2010 regardless of their pre-existing 
level of fraud. As a result, if the automated election system eliminates election fraud, then areas 
with previously high levels of election fraud will experience a greater reduction in fraud 
compared to the low-fraud areas. This allows me to compare how government performance 
changes in the historically high-fraud towns relative to the low-fraud towns over the same 
period. Since my preferred specification includes region-by-year fixed effects, the specific 
identifying assumption is that absent the switch to the automated election system, the historically 
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high-fraud towns would have experienced changes in government performance similar to what 
the low-fraud towns in the same region experienced. Importantly, I show that the empirical 
evidence is consistent with this assumption, as both high- and low-election fraud towns changed 
similarly in the years prior and then diverged immediately after the switch. 
To measure election fraud, I use the digit-based tests outlined by Beber and Scacco (2012), 
and validated against actual election fraud by Weidmann and Callen (2013), to examine the 
uniformity of the last digits of vote totals obtained by each mayoral candidate. Evidence of 
election fraud would be if some digits, such as zero or five, occur as the last digit more 
frequently than others. Government performance is measured using the number of building 
permits approved each year at the town level. New construction as well as repairs and 
improvements require permit approval from local building officials. I show descriptive evidence 
that government officials often ask for bribes during the permitting process, and that this is 
associated with longer waiting times. Thus, the performance and integrity of local governments 
can have a direct impact on the amount of investment activity that each town can attract.  
Digit-based tests provide evidence that historically high-fraud towns indeed experienced 
significantly greater election fraud than other towns during the manual election period. The tests 
also show that election fraud in both groups was driven to undetectably low levels in the 
automated election period, a finding that is consistent with Crost, Felter, Mansour, and Rees 
(2014), who find that incumbents are no longer able to manipulate close elections in 2010 
compared to 2007.  
Results indicate that reducing election fraud caused the number of approved building 
permits to increase by 15 to 17 percent. Since red tape and the ensuing bribe requests cause 
delays in the processing of building permits, this large increase in the number of approved 
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building permits provides suggestive evidence that these obstacles likely decreased. Descriptive 
data from selected Philippine cities surveyed by the World Bank are consistent with this 
interpretation, as the average waiting time to get a building permit decreased by 26 days without 
a corresponding drop in the number of required procedures. In addition, one might also 
reasonably expect that this improvement in government performance will facilitate economic 
growth, since building permits proxy for greater investment flows into the local economy 
(Berman, Felter, Kapstein, and Troland, 2013). These estimates are robust to the inclusion of a 
time-varying control for population, the inclusion of region-by-year fixed effects, and the 
inclusion of town-specific linear time trends, which allow each town to follow a different trend 
over time.  
These findings have important implications for policy. First, by showing that automated 
election technology reduced election fraud, I demonstrate that electoral accountability can be 
increased by preventing candidates from manipulating vote totals in their favor. Perhaps more 
importantly, results here demonstrate the positive effects of investing in credible elections on an 
outcome.  To the extent that results here generalize to other contexts, the findings indicate that 
reducing election fraud can result in meaningful differences in the type of government 
performance that directly affects economic development.  
2.2 Institutional Background 
2.2.1 Introduction of Automated Elections and Research Design 
The Philippines is a constitutional republic in Southeast Asia. It is currently divided into 18 
administrative regions, containing a total of 81 provinces, and 1634 towns (Philippine Statistics 
Authority, 2015). Elections for national and local positions are held every three years, except for 
the presidency and vice-presidency, which are held every six years. Prior to 2010, these elections 
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used a manual election system. The use of a manual election system provided many fraudulent 
ways to manipulate election outcomes even after the votes have been cast. I specifically focus on 
the types of election fraud that occur during or after Election Day (Mala and Pangilinan, 2011). 
Examples of these include ballot box snatching (intercepting and destroying valid ballot boxes), 
ballot box stuffing (substituting fake ballots for valid ballots), vote padding or shaving (dagdag-
bawas in the Filipino vernacular, which literally translates as “plus-minus”), and outright 
fabrication of election returns and canvassed results.  
Several features of the manual election system made it particularly susceptible to election 
fraud. First, the ballots had blank spaces in which voters were to write down the names of the 
candidates they wished to vote for. The voters could change their choices simply by crossing out 
the names and replacing them with new ones. While this feature allowed voters to change their 
mind or correct a mistake, the downside was that it potentially allowed people other than the 
voters to change their vote after ballots have already been cast. Second, compared to the ballots 
used in the automated election system, the manual election ballots were relatively easy to 
duplicate (Singson, 2010). This made it easy to commit ballot stuffing, a type of election fraud 
where fake ballots are stuffed into ballot boxes to add to or even substitute for the valid ballots 
that actual voters filled out on Election Day. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the actual 
counting and canvassing of ballots was done by hand. This process was time consuming and 
prone to error and manipulation. While it is difficult to obtain data on exactly how long the 
counting took prior to the reform, reports indicate it could take more than 30 days (Mugica, 
2015). The longer time window provided many opportunities to commit election fraud after 
ballots have already been cast, for example by changing the vote totals during the tallying 
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process, or by intercepting and changing the election returns reported by the polling centers 
(Mala and Pangilinan, 2011). 
 The Philippines has tried to switch to automated elections since the 1990s. After several 
false starts and a successful piloting of various voting technologies in regional elections in the 
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM),1 the Commission on Elections finally 
chose and deployed the automated election system in the May 2010 national and local elections. 
The new system addressed many of the vulnerabilities of the manual election system, from the 
security of ballots to the speed and accuracy of vote tallying. First, the new ballots come with 
security features and are bar-coded in UV ink to the specific precincts they were issued for. This 
means that the new ballots cannot be easily duplicated or used in other precincts. Second, 
erasures were no longer allowed on the ballot. While this means that voters cannot change their 
mind, it also means that no one else can change their votes. Another important improvement of 
the automated election system over the manual election system is the deployment of precinct-
level optical scanning machines to scan and transmit the votes. This greatly sped up the counting 
and canvassing process, since the precinct-level optical scanning machines report their vote 
tallies up the aggregation chain and to a transparency server immediately after counting. The 
transmission chain has the advantage of being fast and transparent, since the vote tallies obtained 
after aggregation at the central server must match the tallies reported to a transparency server. 
The speed of the automated counting also meant that the time window in which to commit 
election fraud was considerably shortened. Randomized manual audits conducted after the 2010 
                                                 
1 The ARMM is an autonomous region in the Philippines that was formed in 1989. In decreasing order of size, the Philippines is 
divided into regions, provinces, and towns. The ARMM is the only region that has its own government. Only positions for this 
regional government was up for grabs in 2008, making 2010 also the first local elections in the ARMM to use the automated 
election system. 
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and 2013 elections concluded that the precinct-level optical scanning machines were 99.6 
percent accurate in 2010, and 99.9 percent accurate in 2013 (Crisostomo, 2015). 
2.2.2 Construction in the Philippines 
There are significant regulations facing the construction industry in the Philippines.  Ostensibly 
these regulations exist to ensure public safety.  However, red tape and the resulting slow process 
to comply with these regulations also provide an opportunity for corrupt officials to request and 
receive bribes.  Firms may be tempted to pay such bribes in the hopes of speeding up the 
application process.  Thus, the quality of local governments affects the number of building 
permits that can be approved each year through their control over red tape and the likelihood of 
firms being asked for bribes.  
New construction, as well as repairs and improvements to existing structures, require 
building permit approval from the Office of Local Building Officials. Obtaining building permit 
approval often requires ancillary permits from several different agencies as well, which greatly 
increases firms’ exposure to corruption. Table A.1 summarizes World Bank data on the number 
of procedures and waiting time to gain approval in selected towns in the Philippines. There is 
substantial variation across towns in the number of procedures and waiting time to gain approval. 
For instance in 2011, obtaining a building permit takes 169 days in the capital city of Manila, 
while in the adjacent city of Makati the waiting time is only 90 days. There is also variation over 
time. From 2008 to 2011, the average number of procedures increased from around 28 to 30, but 
the average waiting time decreased from around 132 days to 106 days.  
The wide variation in waiting times is noteworthy because there is evidence that longer 
approval times are associated with requests for bribes in many countries around the world 
(Freund, Hallward-Driemeier, and Rijkers, 2015). Figure A.1 plots the kernel density of how 
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long it takes to get a building permit approved in the Philippines, by whether or not firms are 
asked for bribes. It shows that while there is some overlap, the kernel density for the firms asked 
for bribes is shifted to the right of the firms not asked for bribes. Although this is not conclusive 
evidence of a causal connection, it does show that the descriptive evidence is consistent with 
bribery incidence being associated with longer wait times for building permit approval. Table 
A.2 presents regression results estimating the strength of this relationship using various 
specifications that include controls for important factors such as firm characteristics, managerial 
experience, worker productivity, and interaction with government officials. The association 
between bribery incidence and waiting time remains meaningful and significant even after 
controlling for these variables. These estimates suggest that being asked for a bribe is associated 
with a 40 to 60 percent delay in the time that it takes to get a building permit approved. Taken 
together, this suggests there may be room for improvements in government performance to 
increase the number of approved building permits by streamlining the permitting process and 
reducing corruption. 
 Such improvements could well have important effects on prospects for economic 
development. Corruption in general has been found to be one of the most important determinants 
of investment (Asiedu and Freeman, 2009), and even just a one percent increase in bribe 
incidence is associated with a three percent reduction in firm growth (Fisman and Svensson, 
2007). Moreover, the waiting time and complexity of application process for building permits 
has been identified in a survey of firms as the biggest regulatory obstacle to doing business. 
Research in the U.S. finds that speeding up the permitting process could spur construction 
spending (as cited in World Bank Group, 2016). Since businesses would prefer to locate in areas 
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where such regulatory burdens are lighter, improving government performance in the building 
permitting process can encourage more investment and consequently greater economic growth.  
2.3 Introduction of Automated Elections and Research Design 
2.3.1 Measuring Election Fraud from Vote Totals 
I obtained elections data from the Commission on Elections in the Philippines. The data contain 
the final vote tallies obtained by each candidate for local office. In the Philippines, local 
elections for mayor, vice-mayor and town council are held every three years. The elections data 
are available for 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2013 elections. This yields three elections in the 
manual election period and two elections in the automated election period. Two of the elections, 
years 2004 and 2010, were presidential election years. I focus on elections for mayor, as it is the 
highest and most important executive office in each town. To forensically assess the level of 
fraud in each period using only vote totals, I employ the digit-based tests proposed by Beber and 
Scacco (2012), and validated by Weidmann and Callen (2013). The idea behind these tests is that 
absent election fraud, each digit from zero to nine should be equally likely to appear as the last 
digit of a vote total. However, research in psychology and statistics (Boland and Hutchinson, 
2000; Dlugosz and Müller-Funk, 2009) suggest that people favor some digits over others when 
they attempt to manipulate vote totals. The implication of this is that analyzing the digits that 
appear in vote totals can provide forensic evidence of election fraud. I operationalize this idea by 
examining the actual distribution of last digits of vote totals for mayoral candidates in high-fraud 
areas and low-fraud areas, before and after automated elections. I use chi-squared tests to 
determine whether the observed frequencies of the last digits follow the predicted frequencies 
from a uniform distribution, and Mann-Whitney U tests to determine whether the observed 
frequencies of last digits differ between high-fraud areas and low-fraud areas. 
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2.3.2 Election Hotspots 
To identify historically high-fraud areas, I obtained a list of towns that were consistently 
declared election hotspots from 2001 to 2007 (Eder and Barrientos, 2007). Election hotspots are 
towns where the Philippine National Police (PNP) expects election-related violence to occur. 
The PNP identifies towns as election hotspots ahead of each election if they satisfy the following 
criteria: 1) has a history of politically-motivated incidents, and 2) there are armed groups present 
in the area, such as separatist rebels or private army groups associated with influential 
politicians. A town is classified as an election hotspot if it meets both criteria (De Jesus, 2015).2 
As shown in Figure A. 2, consistent election hotspots are geographically distributed all 
over the Philippines. This means that estimated results are unlikely to be driven by just one or 
two regions of the Philippines that are significantly different from the rest. Also, since consistent 
election hotspots are located in several regions of the Philippines, I can control for town-specific 
and region-by-year specific shocks.  
The implicit assumption in identifying high-fraud areas using the list of consistent 
election hotspots is that consistent election hotspots are also the towns that experienced greater 
election fraud during the manual election period. The digit-based tests discussed earlier confirm 
that the consistent election hotspots did in fact exhibit greater election fraud compared to other 
towns during that time period. However, digit-based tests also suggest that towns adjacent to 
consistent election hotspots appear to also have experienced greater election fraud than other 
towns. Institutionally, this may happen because the presence of groups that carry out election 
                                                 
2 I also investigated the possibility of identifying high-fraud and low-fraud towns empirically by examining applying the digit-
based technique to historical vote totals.  However, because I have data on only three elections prior to the reform, it is difficult 
for me to distinguish between randomness and fraud using the digit-based technique. 
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fraud may be shared between local politicians3 (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2011). Since 
they appear to share characteristics of high election fraud areas and yet are not in the list of 
consistent election hotspots, it is ambiguous whether they should be considered part of the 
comparison group or the treatment group. Because of this, I compare consistent election hotspots 
to other towns that are not adjacent to consistent election hotspots but are located in the 
provinces that contain the consistent election hotspots. 
2.3.3 Data on Approved Building Permits 
Lastly, data on approved building permits come from the Philippine Statistics Authority. Each 
year, field personnel in each town gather data from the Office of Local Building Officials. 
Building permit data are based on copies of original application forms of approved building 
permits as well as from demolition permits. Table A.3 describes the data for the hotspot 
(historically high-fraud) towns compared to non-hotspot (historically low-fraud) towns. On 
average, hotspot towns have fewer and lower- valued building permits approved each year. 
2.3.4 Empirical Strategy  
The fact that the automated election system was deployed in all towns regardless of the pre-
existing level of fraud generates plausibly exogenous variation in election fraud around the 2010 
elections. In particular, the towns that previously experienced relatively more election fraud will 
experience a relatively greater reduction in election fraud. This allows me to employ a research 
design that examines whether outcomes change more in towns that experience greater reductions 
in election fraud. As discussed in the previous section, I identify towns that experienced 
relatively high levels of election fraud by referring to a list of towns that were consistent election 
                                                 
3 Also sourced from phone interviews with Philippine National Police. 
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hotspots during the 2001, 2004, and 2007 national and local elections. I compare how outcomes 
change for this group of towns to the change in outcomes observed for towns that are non-
adjacent but are still located in the same provinces that contain hotspots. I employ digit-based 
tests to verify that fraud did in fact decrease more in the towns that were consistent election 
hotspots relative to the comparison group. Specifically, I formally test whether there was more 
election fraud, as measured by zeroes occurring more often as the last digit, in the consistent 
election hotspots than in the other towns during the manual election years. I then test whether 
both groups exhibit any evidence of election fraud during the automated election years. I do this 
by using goodness-of-fit tests to test the observed frequencies of last digits against predicted 
frequencies from a uniform distribution, and by using the Mann-Whitney U test to compare 
observed distributions of last digits against each other.4 
Fixed effects ordinary least squares (OLS) panel data models are estimated to determine 
the impact of reducing election fraud on how many building permits get approved each year. The 
OLS model estimated is a generalized difference-in-differences specification:  
𝑙𝑛(𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽(ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡) + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where 𝑙𝑛(𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡), the log of building permits reported at the town level is the 
dependent variable, ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 is the treatment variable that takes on a 
value of 1 for hotspot towns in the automated election period (2010 and later), and 𝑐𝑖 and 
𝑢𝑡  control for town and year fixed effects, respectively. This is a generalized difference-in-
differences specification where the town fixed effects subsume a time-invariant indicator for 
being a hotspot while the year fixed effects subsume an indicator for the automated election 
                                                 
4 The Mann-Whitney test is a nonparametric hypothesis test where the null hypothesis is that both distributions of last digits are 
drawn from the same distribution.  
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period. In other specifications I include region-by-year fixed effects, which account for the 
effects of regional shocks and allow towns in different administrative regions to follow different 
trajectories over time, and town-specific linear time trends. Robust standard errors are clustered 
at the town level. 
Since my preferred specification includes both town fixed effects and region-by-year 
fixed effects, the identifying assumption is that absent the switch to the automated election 
system, consistent election hotspots would have experienced changes in building permit approval 
similar to what other towns in the same administrative region of the country experienced. I test 
and relax this identifying assumption in the following ways. First, I graphically examine whether 
governance outcomes for hotspots and non-hotspots started diverging before 2010. I also 
formally test this by including an indicator for the year before automated elections were adopted, 
and by plotting estimated differences over time. If hotspots and non-hotspots were not changing 
similarly during the manual election period, it would suggest that the change experienced by the 
non-hotspots in the automated election period is not a valid counterfactual for the change the 
hotspots would have experienced absent the reduction in election fraud. Also, since automated 
elections only started in 2010, and its successful implementation was uncertain until that same 
year, if hotspots and non-hotspots had started diverging even before the 2010 elections, then the 
improvement in government performance might be due to something other than the reduction in 
election fraud. Lastly, I include town-specific linear time trends, which allows each town to 
follow a different trend over time. To the extent that the estimates are robust to these 
specifications, these tests provide some evidence to support the validity of this research design. 
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2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Impact of Automated Elections on Election Fraud 
I begin by forensically measuring the election fraud present in consistent election hotspots during 
the manual election years of 2001, 2004, and 2007, and then comparing it to the election fraud 
measured during the automated election years of 2010 and 2013. I do the same for the other 
towns. This allows me to compare how much election fraud levels in hotspots changed after the 
adoption of automated elections relative to the change experienced by non-hotspots during the 
same time period. Figure A.3 summarizes the results from this exercise. It graphs the distribution 
of the last digits during the manual and automated election periods for hotspots and non-
hotspots, and displays the results of chi-squared tests that examine whether each digit appears 
with equal probability. Both groups of towns appear to have experienced election fraud in the 
manual period, as evidenced by zeros occurring as the last digit more than ten percent of the 
time. However, the election fraud experienced by hotspot towns seems to have been much worse. 
Zeroes occur as the last digit almost 20 percent of the time in the hotspot towns, but only about 
12 percent of the time in other towns. Using a Mann-Whitney test, I am able to reject the null 
hypothesis that the last digits of vote totals from hotspot towns are drawn from the same 
distribution as those from the non-hotspot towns during the manual election period. That is, 
although the last digits from non-hotspot towns are also not uniformly distributed in the manual 
election period, indicating the presence of some election fraud, the observed frequency of zeros 
is still much smaller than what is observed in the hotspot towns.  
Election fraud drops significantly in the automated election period in both hotspots and 
non-hotspots. Figure A.3 shows that each digit is now equally likely to appear as the last digit of 
a vote total. Formally, chi-squared tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that the observed 
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frequencies of last digits from either hotspots or non-hotspots follow the predicted frequencies 
from a uniform distribution during the automated election period. In addition, a Mann-Whitney 
test is now unable to reject the null hypothesis that the last digits of vote totals from hotspots are 
drawn from the same distribution as last digits from the non-hotspots. Since hotspots previously 
experienced greater election fraud than non-hotspots, together these tests indicate that the 
automated election system reduced election fraud significantly more in the hotspot towns than in 
the non-hotspot towns.5 
2.4.2 Impact on Government Performance 
I now turn to the question of whether the large reduction in election fraud in hotspots caused 
government performance to improve. To do this, I compare the change in the log of total 
building permits approved in hotspots to the change in the log of total building permits approved 
in non-hotspots, before and after automated elections. To determine whether outcomes had 
started diverging even before treatment, in Figure A.4 I graph the log of the total number of 
building permits approved over time in hotspots compared to other towns. There are a few things 
worth noting in this graph. First, both sets of towns appear to track each other in terms of 
changes in total building permits approved in the years before 2010. This suggests that the 
research design is reasonable, in that if there had been no switch to automated elections, both 
groups would have continued tracking each other after 2010. In fact, there is a sharp rise in 
building permits approved in 2010 in the hotspots relative to the other towns. It then stays at that 
higher level throughout the automated election period. That the effect manifests immediately 
during the first automated election year also gives further evidence that it is the reduction in 
                                                 
5 To provide evidence against the alternative explanation that hotspots may exhibit more zeros due to benign reasons such as 
illiteracy or lack of equipment to facilitate counting many ballots, I redo all of these analyses by splitting the hotspots and non-
hotspots into below median and above median poverty incidence.  
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election fraud that caused the divergence. This also means that elected governments were able to 
quickly improve their performance along this dimension, which is plausible since reducing red 
tape and corruption takes only executive action. Third, the improvement in government 
performance persists in the succeeding years. This is exactly what one would expect if the 
improvement is due to the reduction in election fraud. That is, since election fraud was reduced 
throughout the automated election period, we should expect that government performance should 
continue at a higher level for as long as they are held accountable in elections. 
 In Figure A.5, I graph the estimated divergence between hotspots and non-hotspots over 
time. The figure graphs coefficients from a dynamic difference-in-differences model that 
controls for town and year fixed effects as well as region-by-year fixed effects. The estimated 
differences are relative to the average difference in building permits three or more years before 
automated elections. In line with Figure A.4, Figure A.5 shows that there is little evidence of 
divergence before the switch to automated elections, and that there is a sharp and sustained 
increase in building permits after the election reform occurs.  
Estimation results are shown in Table A.4. In Column 1, where only town and year fixed 
effects are included, the estimated effect of reducing election fraud is an increase in the number 
of building permits approved by about 16.6 percent. This represents a substantial improvement in 
government performance, and is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. In Column 2, I add 
a time-varying control for town-level population and this does not change the estimate. In 
Column 3, my preferred specification, I add region-by-year fixed effects. The inclusion of 
region-by-year fixed effects means that I am comparing changes in hotspots to other towns 
located in the same region of the country and accounting for region-specific shocks over time. 
Given that similar towns are assigned to administrative regions in the Philippines, it is likely that 
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this is the more appropriate comparison to make. The estimate in this preferred specification is 
14.9 percent, and is statistically significant at the five percent level. Column 4 adds an indicator 
for the year 2009, which formally tests whether the hotspots and other towns began to diverge 
even before the switch to automated elections. Since the estimated coefficient on this leading 
indicator is not statistically significant, there is little evidence of divergence before automated 
elections. This is also in line with the parallel pre-trends shown in Figure A.4. Finally, column 5 
adds town-specific linear time trends. Town-specific linear time trends allow for each town to 
follow a different trend. The estimate in column 4 is a 16.7 percent increase in approved building 
permits. For each of these specifications, robust standard errors are clustered at the town level.  
Importantly, all of the estimates are significant at the 5 percent level. Taken together, 
these estimates provide strong evidence that reducing election fraud improved government 
performance along an economically important dimension, the number of building permits that 
are approved each year. 
2.4.3 Potential Mechanisms 
I now examine potential mechanisms through which reducing election fraud may lead to a 
significant improvement in government performance. Government performance might be 
improving because different, higher-performing people are getting elected to office, or even just 
because incumbents now face the threat of being removed from office if they perform poorly. In 
the Philippines, more than half of candidates are incumbent officials running again for the same 
office. These incumbents enjoy substantial electoral advantages such as name recognition and, 
perhaps more importantly, control over local public projects and employees. Incumbent 
candidates win about 80 percent of the time when they run. Incumbent candidates typically win 
by a margin of 30 percentage points over their challengers, reflecting the advantage that 
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incumbents have in elections. Institutional reforms such as term limits have so far failed to 
reduce this advantage (Querubin, 2012).  
If incumbents were cheating during the manual election period, then eliminating election 
fraud may lead to fewer incumbents getting reelected. In Table A.5, I investigate this hypothesis 
directly by estimating the effect on the probability that incumbents win re-election. Estimates 
from various specifications show that there is little evidence that incumbents became less likely 
to win re-election during as a result of the reduction in election fraud. I then examine whether 
incumbents may face more competition, which could induce them to perform better even though 
their likelihood of getting re-elected has not changed.  To do so, I examine whether incumbent 
candidates get a smaller share of the total vote in the automated election period. Table A.6 
presents evidence in favor of this mechanism. Across specifications, the estimated effect is 
approximately a 10 percentage point reduction in the incumbent victory margin. That is, the 
difference between the vote share obtained by winning incumbents and the vote share obtained 
by their closest challenger narrowed by 10 percentage points. This represents the erosion of 
about a third of the average victory margin formerly experienced by winning incumbent. Since a 
decrease in the incumbent candidates’ victory margins would imply an increase in the vote share 
received by challengers, this would mean that elections between challengers and incumbents 
become more competitive in the automated election period. Thus, reducing election fraud 
appears to increase electoral pressure on re-elected candidates, even though it does not appear to 
decrease the number of incumbents that win re-election. 
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2.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
The fundamental question addressed in this section is whether election fraud causes poor 
government performance, as measured by a proxy for the type of government performance 
widely believed to inhibit economic growth.  If so, reducing election fraud should improve 
government performance and perhaps eventually lead to higher economic growth. The election 
reforms in the Philippines present a unique opportunity to determine whether reducing election 
fraud can have such an effect. The switch to an automated election system in 2010 dramatically 
reduced election fraud, thereby increasing electoral accountability. The reduction in election 
fraud means that winning elections now requires that candidates actually receive the most votes 
from actual people because candidates can no longer manipulate election results after the ballots 
have been cast. An analysis of vote shares reveals that the reduction in election fraud also 
appeared to negatively affect the victory margins enjoyed by winning incumbents, suggesting 
that the reform increased electoral pressure on incumbents.   
Importantly, the reduction in election fraud led to an immediate and sustained 15 to 17 
percent increase in the number of building permits approved. This result is robust to using 
various specifications, including adding region-by-year fixed effects, and town-specific linear 
time trends. Secondary descriptive data from World Bank surveys indicate that the average 
number of procedures actually increased slightly around the time of election reform so there is 
little evidence to suggest that building permit requirements were suddenly relaxed. Rather, it 
seems to be the case that improvements in government performance, whether by reducing red 
tape or by reducing bribe requests, are the drivers of this increase. The descriptive data are also 
consistent with this explanation, as the average waiting time actually decreased by 26 days. Since 
building permits are mandatory for any construction to take place, the removal of bottlenecks in 
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the application process can have strong positive effects on the local economy. Of course, it 
remains an open question whether other, more difficult to measure, functions of government 
improve as a result of the reduction in election fraud.  But what is clear is that at least in this 
context, reducing election fraud results in a large and sustained improvement in a measure of 
government performance capturing investment in the local economy. 
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3. DOES ELECTORAL PRESSURE LEAD TO BETTER GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE? 
3.1 Introduction  
Poor and unresponsive governments are often characterized by corruption and a lack of 
effort in performing assigned responsibilities (Grindle, 2004; Olken and Pande, 2012). Elections 
are meant to mitigate this problem by providing voters with an accountability mechanism to 
incentivize responsive performance. The underlying idea is that in response to this electoral 
pressure, incumbent politicians will exert effort in the performance of their duties to be rewarded 
at the next election. The focus of this section is to determine whether electoral pressure affects 
government performance. 
Economic theory predicts that pressure from upcoming elections might lead incumbent 
politicians to strategically perform better in times of increased electoral pressure (Rogoff, 1990; 
Bechtel and Hainmueller, 2011). Empirical evidence of such strategic responses has been 
documented in the form of political business cycles in government spending (Akhmedov and 
Zhuravskaya, 2004; Besley and Burgess, 2002; Besley and Case, 1995; Khemani, 2004; Drazen 
and Eslava, 2010; De Haan and Klomp, 2016; Repetto, 2017), corrupt behavior (Ferraz and 
Finan, 2011), and police expenditure and hiring (Levitt, 1997; Guillamon, Bastida, and Benito, 
2011). This section complements this literature by examining an outcome that more directly 
measures the effort government puts into their responsibilities, which is arguably more in line 
with existing theory. Specifically, I ask whether local governments in the Philippines evacuate 
more of their affected population in preparation for tropical cyclones, an activity that requires 
significant political capital and effort due to the need to identify, warn, persuade, and transport 
people who would otherwise be incapable or unwilling to evacuate. In addition, in contrast to the 
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spending measures used in the existing literature, the outcome used here likely has large and 
direct consequences for public safety and mortality. 
To this end, I use Philippine data to examine whether increased electoral pressure affects 
government performance, as measured by the number of people they evacuate each year in 
preparation for tropical cyclones. The Philippines is an archipelago in Southeast Asia that 
experiences tropical cyclones several times each year. To prepare for these storms, governors 
lead evacuation efforts to move their affected population to evacuation shelters. They coordinate 
and request resources from the national government to accomplish this. Evacuation of the 
affected population serves two goals: 1) protect people from the damaging and potentially fatal 
effects of tropical cyclones; and 2) provide temporary food and shelter to those that might 
otherwise be homeless due to the destruction of homes that is commonplace with these storms. 
To identify the effect of electoral pressure on evacuations, I exploit institutional variation in 
electoral pressure in the Philippines generated by term limits and the remaining time until the 
next election. Because third-term governors are barred from seeking re-election, upcoming 
elections matter less to them than to governors that are still eligible to run. Thus, the eligible 
governors are under greater electoral pressure than the ineligible governors. I also exploit 
variation over time and compare evacuation performance in the final year of governors’ terms. 
The idea is that in the final year of their terms, eligible governors are under increased electoral 
pressure due to the salience of the upcoming election while ineligible governors face only the 
same pressures as earlier in their terms. The identifying assumption underlying this approach is 
that absent the increase in electoral pressure from the upcoming election, evacuations in 
provinces whose governors were eligible to run for re-election would have trended similarly 
compared to provinces whose governors were ineligible to run. I show graphical evidence in 
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favor of this assumption, as both groups of provinces appear to have evacuated at similar rates 
during the first two years of governors’ terms. 
Results from fixed effects panel data models indicate that increased electoral pressure leads 
to a statistically significant 20 percentage point increase in the fraction of the affected population 
that is evacuated. This finding is robust to various specifications, including adding controls for 
tropical cyclone distance and provincial population. As a falsification check, I also show that this 
effect manifests only in the final year of the three-year term and not earlier in the term. Finally, I 
show that this effect grows as elections get closer, which is to be expected if electoral pressure is 
driving the increase in evacuations. 
These findings are important for several reasons. By focusing on an outcome that more 
directly measures effort, I show that electoral pressure can affect government behavior beyond 
its spending choices. Importantly, the effort that governments put into the task under study can 
have positive effects on public safety in the wake of natural disasters. This has an immediate and 
direct effect on citizen well-being, since being served in evacuation shelters shields them from 
life-threatening situations and gives them access to food and medicine during a vulnerable time. 
Overall, the findings suggest that even in contexts where government is generally ineffectual, 
electoral pressure does seem to generate additional effort by politicians. 
The rest of this section is organized as follows. The next subsection discusses the tropical 
cyclone risk in the Philippines, and presents the institutional background of Philippine politics. 
Then, Subsection 3.3 discusses the data used in the study and the empirical strategy. Subsection 
4 presents the results from various estimations. Subsection 3.5 concludes. 
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3.2 Institutional Background 
3.2.1 Tropical Cyclone Exposure and Evacuation Process in the Philippines 
The Philippines is an archipelago in Southeast Asia, an area that is most often affected by 
tropical cyclones. The country is regularly in the path of tropical cyclones that form in the 
Pacific Ocean and move toward mainland Asia or Japan. The Philippines is affected by around 
20 tropical cyclones each year, of which nine tropical cyclones make landfall on average. The 
peak season for tropical cyclones is July to September, but tropical cyclones can affect the 
Philippines at any time. These tropical cyclones come in varying intensities and sizes, and affect 
different parts of the country (Takagi and Esteban, 2016). The tropical cyclone risk, coupled with 
other natural disaster risks, makes the Philippines the third-ranked country by exposure to natural 
hazards (United Nations, 2015).  
With a population of 100 million, the Philippines has a substantial number of people 
living in areas that are prone to flooding and landslides. Preparing for tropical cyclones requires 
evacuating these people, both to prevent casualties and because flooding and landslides would 
otherwise leave these people homeless and without food and medicine due to the destruction of 
homes that is commonplace with these storms (Diacon, 1992). Under the 1991 Local 
Government Code, much of this responsibility has been devolved to local governments. As the 
highest ranking local executive officials, governors oversee evacuation efforts in their province. 
However, the national government still provides the infrastructure and services to support local 
evacuation efforts. The task of governors is to coordinate activities within their province and 
request assistance from the national government when necessary (World Bank, 2005). Figure 
A.6 illustrates how the evacuation process works in the Philippines. Once a tropical cyclone 
enters the Philippine Area of Responsibility, the Philippine Atmospheric Geophysical and 
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Astronomical Services Administration issues periodic forecasts. These forecasts are used to 
identify the affected population and notify their local government units, starting with the 
provinces and down the chain to the municipalities. These local government units warn the 
affected population and issue evacuation orders if necessary. The provincial governor 
coordinates these efforts and ensures that the necessary resources are available. The governor’s 
task is made even more difficult when people are reluctant to obey evacuation orders for fear of 
losing valuables to looters (Manila, 2013).6 When carrying out a mass evacuation, the provincial 
governor may have to request transportation assistance, such as trucks and boats from the police 
and/or the military, and send them to the places in which they are needed.  In conjunction with 
these efforts, national government agencies such as the Department of Social Welfare and 
Development and the Department of Health preposition food packs and medical supplies in the 
evacuation shelters. Once served in evacuation shelters, people stay until it is safe to return to 
their homes. 7 
3.2.2 Elections and Term Limits in the Philippines 
At present, the Philippines is divided into 18 administrative regions, containing a total of 81 
provinces, 145 cities, and 1,489 municipalities (Philippine Statistics Authority, 2015). As there is 
no elective office for administrative regions, the highest ranking local government official is the 
provincial governor. Elections for governor are held with all other national and local elections 
every three years in May, with the winning candidates taking their office in July. Candidates 
                                                 
6 In December 2016, a tropical cyclone was forecast to affect a province in the Philippines around Christmas Day. Because of the 
upcoming festivities, affected people did not want to evacuate. To incentivize evacuation, their governor offered roast pork, a 
traditional festival meal, in the shelters (Tantiangco, 2017). 
7 Source: phone interview with NDRRMC office. 
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must declare their candidacy in the preceding October. This setup makes the end of their term the 
period during which elections are arguably most salient.  
In the Philippines, governors, along with all other local officials, are limited to serving 
three consecutive three-year terms. After serving in one capacity for nine consecutive years, 
governors are termed out/ineligible and must step down or seek election to a different office. 
Although political dynasties have been prohibited under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, it is 
possible for termed out politicians to circumvent the three-term limit by running for a different 
office (Querubin, 2012). This makes it easier for a former three-term governor to run for 
governor again after sitting out one term. I account for this by excluding ineligible governors 
who run for other office. Finally, it should also be noted that local parties are not necessarily 
allied with ruling national parties. In the Philippines, local elections are dominated by families. 
3.3 Data and Empirical Strategy 
3.3.1 Data 
I obtain data on evacuations, casualties, and damages due to tropical cyclones from the National 
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council. The data cover the period 2005-2014, and 
are reported at the province-tropical cyclone level. The data are culled from status updates and 
reports posted by the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council. These reports 
include information for each province on the number of affected population, number of people 
evacuated, number of casualties and assessed damages attributable to each tropical cyclone that 
affected that province. From this data, the fraction of people evacuated in each province for each 
tropical cyclone is constructed by dividing the number of people evacuated by the number of 
people affected. The affected population is defined by identifying at-risk areas and summing the 
total population in those areas. The number of people evacuated is counted by evacuation camp 
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managers deployed by the Department of Social Welfare and Development. Since they are 
employees of the national government, these camp managers do not report to the governors. 
Fatalities are counted if there is sufficient evidence that they can be attributed to the tropical 
cyclone instead of other causes. This is a less straightforward process compared to counting the 
number of evacuees. 
I construct a balanced panel by annualizing this tropical cyclone-level data for each 
province. To account for the degree of tropical cyclone exposure, I merge this dataset with actual 
tropical cyclone track data from the International Best Track Archive for Climate Stewardship. I 
use this to calculate the closest distance that each tropical cyclone’s eye ever got to each 
province. I classify provinces as being directly hit by a tropical cyclone if the eye of the tropical 
cyclone passes within 47 kilometers of the province. The area defined by the 47 kilometer radius 
is typically where the strongest winds and heaviest precipitation falls. 
To measure re-election incentives, I use election outcomes for all gubernatorial races 
during over the period 2001-2016 from the Commission on Elections. Given the three-
consecutive terms limit, I am able to identify ineligible incumbents beginning with the 2007 
election.  Thus, the final data cover the time period 2007-2014. Table A.7 describes the sample 
of unique governors in the data and breaks it down by the number of consecutive terms that they 
serve. There is roughly an even distribution of governors when broken down by this metric. Of 
the 47 governors that are termed out after serving three consecutive terms, 21 seek re-election to 
a different provincial office in the next election. I exclude these 21 governors from the analysis, 
because governors that seek re-election to a different provincial office when they become 
ineligible to run for governor differ in important ways from ineligible governors that do not run 
again.   Since governors can serve multiple terms, each governor can appear in the data more 
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than once, and so Table A.8 breaks down the province-level data by the term of their governor. 
Most of the provinces are headed by a first-term governor, and provinces are affected by about 2 
tropical cyclones each year regardless of the election eligibility of their governor. On average, 
approximately 39,800 people are evacuated out of a total affected population of 116,400 for an 
evacuation rate of 34 percent. There are fewer than 20 fatalities attributable to tropical cyclones. 
3.3.2 Empirical Strategy 
I exploit variation in electoral pressure arising from the rule that prohibits incumbents who have 
already served three consecutive terms from seeking reelection to the same office. This term 
limit allows me to compare the difference between tropical cyclone preparations in provinces 
whose governors are eligible to run and provinces whose governors are no longer eligible to run, 
and who do not seek re-election to a different provincial office. Since these groups may still 
differ along aspects that would affect how thoroughly they evacuate, I use the remaining time to 
the next elections (or equivalently, the remaining time in a governor’s term) as a second 
difference. The idea is that the time to the next elections should only matter to the governors who 
can still seek reelection, because voters can no longer hold ineligible governors accountable for 
their performance at the next elections.  
I estimate fixed effects panel data models to determine the impact of electoral pressure on 
the number of evacuees per affected population. The OLS panel data model estimated can be 
thought of as a generalized difference-in-differences specification:  
it 1 it t 2 it 3 t 4 it i t itEVAC = β (eligible * yearbeforeelections )+ β eligible + β yearbeforeelections + β storms +c +u +ε        
 
Where itEVAC  is the number of people evacuated relative to the affected population in a 
province i in year t, iteligible  is an indicator for whether the governor of province i is in the first 
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or second consecutive term during year t, tyearbeforeelections  is an indicator for whether it is 
12 months from the end of a term, itstorms  controls for the number of times a province i is 
affected by a tropical cyclone in year t and i tc  ,u  are province fixed effects and year fixed 
effects, respectively. Robust standard errors are clustered at the province level. Other 
specifications also include controls for population as well as the number of direct hits a province 
got each year.  
The identifying assumption underlying this approach is that absent the increase in electoral 
pressure due to the upcoming election, evacuations in provinces whose governors can seek re-
election would have trended similarly with evacuations in provinces whose governors are 
ineligible to run. I examine the validity of this assumption in the following ways. I start by 
graphically examining whether the fraction of people evacuated at the start of a three-year term 
is similar across provinces regardless of the term their governors are in. If evacuations in 
provinces headed by governors in different terms already trend differently in the years prior to 
the last year of the term, then they might not be valid comparisons for each other. I also examine 
whether estimates are robust to including a control for province-level population, a determinant 
of how many people need to be evacuated. Under the identifying assumption, population should 
not change more over time in provinces headed by eligible governors. For example, if population 
increases more during the final year in provinces when they are headed by eligible governors, 
then evacuations in those provinces might have increased ahead of elections relative to provinces 
headed by ineligible governors even without the increase in electoral pressure. Finally, I examine 
whether the results are robust to including indicators for governor fixed effects, which account 
for governors that serve more than once or drop out during the time period under study. This 
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ensures that any effects are not driven by compositional differences in the behavior of governors 
who reach their third term and those who do not.   
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Effect on Evacuations 
I start by graphing the raw data of the fraction of the affected population evacuated in provinces, 
by term and breaking down three-year terms into first two years and last year of the term 
(increased electoral pressure). This is shown in Figure A.7. This graph highlights two important 
features of the data. First, it appears that people are evacuated at similar rates in the first two 
years of a term regardless of the type of governor. This is also confirmed using t-tests. Second, 
the graph shows suggestive evidence that increased electoral pressure affects evacuations. For 
eligible governors, the fraction of the affected population that ends up being evacuated increases 
during the last year of their terms, by about 6 percentage points for first-term governors and 
almost 25 percentage points for second-term governors.8 Strikingly, there is no corresponding 
effect for the ineligible governors, as evacuations seem to have proceeded at the same rate during 
the start of the term compared to the end of the term. Taken together, this pattern of results 
suggests that the spikes in evacuations at the end of the first two terms are due to electoral 
pressure, and not a more general last-year-of-office effect. 
 Estimation results are shown in Table A.9. Each column presents estimates from a 
different specification. All specifications include indicators for whether governors are eligible to 
run and for whether it is the year before the next election. In column 1, where only province and 
                                                 
8 Although these are just raw averages, it is possible that the significantly higher increase in evacuations for second-term 
governors is because the governors that make it to a second term are different from first-term governors in a manner that matters 
for responding to electoral pressure. The increase in evacuations is statistically different from zero for both first and second term 
governors, indicating that the response does not come solely from second term governors. And if governors that get re-elected to 
a second term are better at evacuating people, governors that make it to a third term should be just as effective. 
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year fixed effects are added, the impact of increased electoral pressure is a 23.2 percentage point 
increase in the number of evacuees. This effect is large and statistically significant at the 5 
percent level. It means that for every 100 people identified as affected, an additional 23 are 
evacuated when a province is headed by a governor who faces increased electoral pressure. In 
column 2, I add a control for provincial population, which accounts for the possibility that 
provinces that have a big and/or growing population simply evacuate more of their affected 
population. The estimate from this specification is a 22.5 percentage point increase. Column 3 
includes province and year fixed effects, as well as a time-varying control for the number of 
direct hits that a province took from tropical cyclones each year. Again, the estimated effect is 
steady at about 22.7 percentage points. In Column 4, I estimate a specification that includes 
province and year fixed effects and adds governor fixed effects to account for changes in the 
composition of governors. This results in an estimated effect of 20.4 percentage points, which is 
similar in magnitude and statistically significant at the 10 percent level. In Column 5, I include 
all of the time varying controls discussed earlier and in Column 6, I add governor fixed effects to 
the set of controls. These specifications result in similar estimates.  
3.4.2 Robustness 
 Table A.10 presents the results of robustness checks in which I vary how I define the 
period of increased electoral pressure. All specifications include indicators for whether governors 
are eligible to run, for whether it is the year before the next election, and for province and year 
fixed effects. In the main table, electoral pressure was defined to increase during the last 12 
months of a three-year term. Since it is likely that electoral pressure increases as it gets closer to 
the next election, estimates should be very small when the treatment period is defined to start far 
away from the upcoming election, and grow as the treatment period is defined to start closer and 
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closer to the upcoming election.9 Thus, defining the treatment period to start during the last 20 
months of a three-year term is akin to a falsification check because we would not expect to 
estimate a treatment effect, while we would expect effects to be strongest when the treatment 
period is defined to cover the last few months of a term.  
Column 7 in Table A.10 reproduces the estimated effect in Column 1 of Table A.9, where 
the cutoff for the treatment period is defined as the last 12 months of the term. The first columns 
represent the falsification checks, where I show that if the treatment period is defined to start 
further away from the end of the term, I do not estimate an effect. I start being able to estimate a 
marginally significant treatment effect in Column 3, when increased electoral pressure is defined 
to start in the last 18 months of the term. This corresponds to the time period beginning in 
January of the year before elections. Columns 1 and 2 show smaller point estimates that are not 
statistically significant when the time period is expanded even further back to capture the peak 
tropical cyclone season of the year prior (that is, two peak seasons before the next elections).   
Columns 8 to 10 report estimates when treatment period of increased electoral pressure is 
progressively narrowed from 11 months to 9 months. The estimates remain positive and 
statistically significant, and sometimes slightly larger in magnitude than the baseline 
specification in Column 7. In Column 9 for example, when treatment is defined to start in the last 
10 months of the term, I estimate that increased electoral pressure leads to a 24.7 percentage 
point increase in evacuations.  
                                                 
9 Narrowing the time window further than 9 months is not feasible in this setting, as not many tropical cyclones hit between 
November and June. 
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3.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
The research question examined in this section is whether increased electoral pressure by itself 
leads governors to exert greater effort in the performance of their responsibilities. The setting 
provided by the Philippines allows me to isolate the causal effect because of term limits that 
divide governors into a group that faces electoral pressure and a group that faces much less 
pressure. I exploit this variation and the salience from upcoming elections to identify effects. I 
measure government performance along an important aspect of government responsibilities in 
the Philippines, the number of evacuations in preparation for tropical cyclones. This measure has 
the advantage of isolating effort from spending, as it is the national government that provides 
resources that may be needed by provinces. Evacuating the affected population only requires 
effort from governors in identifying and coordinating the necessary resources. This is a 
potentially lifesaving preparedness measure, and one that disproportionately benefits the poor 
and the vulnerable.  
 Results indicate a substantial effect of electoral pressure on evacuations. I estimate that 
increased electoral pressure leads to a statistically significant 20 percentage point increase in the 
fraction of the affected population evacuated. I show that the estimate is robust to various 
specifications, including controlling for tropical cyclone distance, population, and governor fixed 
effects. I also show that this effect grows as elections get closer and decays as elections are 
farther away. This finding complements previous literature that finds evidence of political 
business cycles in spending, and shows that electoral pressure also results in increases along 
more effort-based measures of government performance. 
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4. DOES CONFLICT EXPOSURE INCREASE IN-GROUP BIAS? EVIDENCE FROM 
EXPERIMENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES 
4.1 Introduction 
This section examines the lasting effects of conflict exposure on in-group bias. Past studies 
document a link between conflict and subsequent economic development (Davis and Weinstein, 
2002; Miguel and Roland, 2005; Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Bauer 
Blattman, Chytilova, Henrich, Miguel, and Mitts, 2016). Potential mechanisms through which 
this effect works include infrastructure, human capital accumulation and health, and lasting 
changes in individual preferences. In this section, we focus on the last mechanism. Existing 
studies on the lasting effects of civil conflict exposure on individual preferences have found 
seemingly contradictory results. On the one hand, studies usually find that conflict exposure in 
general leads to greater in-group favoritism (Whitt and Wilson, 2007; Rohner, Thoenig, and 
Zilibotti, 2013; Voors, Nillesen, Verwimp, Bulte, Lensink, and Van Soest, 2012). On the other 
hand, recent work on Tajikistan by Cassar, Grosjean, and Whitt (2013) find that conflict can lead 
to lower trust within localities. They hypothesize that the reason they find nuanced results was 
because the nature of the Tajik civil war made it difficult to identify friend from foe. Because of 
this, it was possible to be victimized by people that would normally be considered in-group. 
Because most work in this literature focus on single countries where there is typically only one 
form of conflict, they are unable to decompose the effect of different types of conflict. Our 
section contributes to the literature by providing evidence that the interaction between identity 
and the nature of the conflict people are exposed to affects the direction of the effect of conflict 
exposure on in-group bias 
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To do this, we exploit a unique dataset based on the Philippine setting. Specifically, we use 
data gathered using lab-in-the-field experiments and merge it with conflict data from the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program. Doing this allows us to tie community-level conflict exposure in their 
hometown to their individual preferences as measured from their choices in experimental tasks. 
We focus on their actions in the dictator games. Specifically, we measure in-group bias by taking 
the difference between the amount they send to a partner of the same religion and the amount 
they send to a partner of a different religion.   
Using the Philippine setting allows us to study this research question because of the 
presence of two types of conflict: a religious conflict driven by Muslim separatists and an 
indiscriminate conflict driven by communist insurgents, as well as the presence of two dominant 
groups: Christians and Muslims. We exploit the fact that, given how small municipalities are in 
the Philippines, the location of conflict incidents is likely to be as good as random. Because the 
participants in the experiments are mostly migrants to the capital city of Manila, to the extent 
that their decision to migrate is not driven by conflict in their hometown, we also observe 
variation in conflict exposure generated by the timing of the conflict incidents relative to when 
participants leave their hometown. In exploiting these two sources of variation, we make the 
assumption that participants not exposed to conflict provide a good counterfactual to the 
participants exposed to conflict. We do our best to provide evidence in favor of this assumption. 
We show that towns that experienced at least one conflict incident share similar observable 
characteristics to towns that did not experience a conflict incident. We also test whether migrants 
from conflict towns are similar to migrants from non-conflict towns. While we have more males 
and Muslims from conflict towns, we show that accounting for this difference as well as a large 
set of controls does not significantly change our estimates.  
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Our main result is that the effect of conflict exposure on religious in-group bias does 
depend on the type of conflict exposure and the identity of the participant. Specifically, we find 
that being exposed to the religious conflict leads Muslims to become biased against fellow 
Muslims, while being exposed to the indiscriminate conflict leads to Muslims to favor fellow 
Muslims more. We are also able to determine that this effect is driven by changes in the amount 
sent to in-group partners, rather than a change in how participants treat their out-group. These 
effects are robust to a wide range of controls. We control for individual characteristics, conflict 
characteristics, and hometown characteristics and show that our estimates remain stable across 
various specifications. 
These results contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we present evidence that 
different types of conflict can lead to different effects on individual preferences. This matters 
because it provides another explanation for why some countries recover from conflict at different 
rates than others. Second, we reconcile previous findings in the literature that document opposite 
effects on in-group bias. Using the Philippine setting, we are able to show that being victimized 
by people normally considered in-group affects preferences differently than when the conflict is 
indiscriminate. 
The rest of this section is organized as follows. The next subsection lays out the relevant 
details of the Philippine setting, and discusses the history of conflict in the Philippines. 
Subsection 4.3 describes the data we use in the study as well as our empirical strategy. In 
Subsection 4.4, we present evidence to support the validity of our empirical strategy before 
showing our results. Subsection 4.5 concludes. 
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4.2 Institutional Background 
The Philippines is a majority Christian nation with a substantial Muslim minority. Roman 
Catholicism is the dominant religion, but there is a large concentration of Muslims in the 
southern regions of the country. For the most part, Muslims in the northern Philippines are 
migrants from the south. There are also several ethnic groups in the Philippines, but because of 
the geographic nature of the split between Christians and Muslims, ethnic identities tend to be 
nested within religious identity. There are eight major ethnic identities represented in this study: 
Tagalog, Cebuano, Bisaya, Ilocano, Tausug, Yakan, Maguindanao, and Maranao. The first four 
ethnic groups are mostly Christian, while the final four ethnic groups are mostly Muslim. In 
addition, the Tausugs and Yakans are the predominant ethnic groups in the areas where the 
Muslim separatists are based. There are two main long-running conflicts in the Philippines: 1) a 
communist insurgency, and 2) a Muslim separatist movement. The sources of these conflicts are 
different. The root cause of the communist insurgency is deep socioeconomic inequality. 
Importantly, the armed communist group in the Philippines does not discriminate based on 
religion or ethnicity. In fact, its members shed these identities when they join the communist 
movement. On the other hand, the conflict involving Muslim separatists is based on 
religious/ethnic identity (Schiavo-Campo and Judd, 2005). Because of where the Muslim 
separatists base their operations out of, two ethnicities in particular are associated with the 
Muslim separatists: the Tausug and the Yakan. These conflicts date back to the late 1960s, and 
incidents tend to be geographically dispersed throughout the country. Figure A. 8 shows a map 
of the Philippines with the towns that reportedly experienced conflict highlighted in red. This 
map shows that these towns are geographically distributed all over the Philippines. This implies 
that it is unlikely for a few, potentially different areas to drive our results. Figure A. 9 shows how 
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the number of reported conflict incidents evolved over time. Across the entire Philippines, 
conflict incidents were relatively fewer in the late 1970s to early 1980s. Since then however, 
conflict incident reports have been much higher with the exception of the late 1990s. We discuss 
how conflict incidents are recorded in Section 3.1.2 
4.3 Data and Empirical Strategy 
4.3.1 Data on Social Preferences 
We use field experiments to measure social preferences. The experiments were conducted from 
September-October 2009, in three sites in Metro Manila that have established Muslim 
settlements: Maharlika Village in Taguig City, Barangay Culiat in Quezon City, and Greenhills 
in San Juan City. The first two locations are low-income communities while the third is a 
commercial area. The choice of sites ensures that there is a mix of religious and ethnic identities 
represented in the experiments. In total, 328 individuals participated in the experiments, of which 
199 migrated to Metro Manila from elsewhere. In each site, we held pure Muslim sessions, 
mixed Muslim and Christian sessions, and pure Christian sessions. The experiments were spread 
across 17 sessions. Table A.11 breaks down our sample by type of session. 
Participants in the experiment did five tasks: risk preference game, time preference 
measure, dictator game, public good game and trust game. They were paid based on their 
decisions in one randomly chosen task. We use the dictator game to measure altruism toward in-
group and out-group members. We conducted four dictator games, and in each game participants 
were asked to divide 500 Philippine pesos (approximately 10 dollars) between themselves and 
another participant who is of the: 1) same religion; 2) different religion; 3) same ethnicity; and 4) 
different ethnicity. The first two games are used to measure in-group/out-group preferences 
based on religious identity while the last two games are used to measure preferences based on 
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ethnic identity. Figure A. 10 shows a translated decision page for a participant whose is Muslim 
(religion) and Maranao (ethnicity). Senders are partnered with recipients of unknown ethnicity, 
but who are of the same religion in dictator game 1, and the different religion in dictator game 2 
Because ethnicities are nested within religions, we only vary the ethnicity of the receiver in 
dictator games 3 and 4. We use the difference between the amounts sent in dictator games 1 and 
2 to measure religious in-group bias, and we use the difference between the amounts sent in 
dictator games 3 and 4 to measure ethnic in-group bias. The participants were informed that their 
partners also took part in the experiment, but are possibly not in the same session. 
4.3.2 Conflict Data 
Data on conflict come from two sources. The main source of data is the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program. (Allansson, Melander, Themnér, 2017). However, because the UCDP data is only 
available from 1989 onward, we supplement it using data compiled by Abinales and Ramos.10 
Both datasets mainly rely on local newspapers, television, and radio sources to report conflict 
incidents. An incident in the data reflects an armed encounter between two armed groups, or 
between an armed group and civilians. Both datasets record the date and location of each 
incident. This allows us to tag participants who may have been exposed to conflict when they 
were still in their hometown.11   In addition, the UCDP data contain information on casualties as 
well as the groups involved in each incident. While we are unable to perfectly identify whether 
each of our participants was directly affected by the conflict incidents, the combined conflict 
dataset does allow us to construct a community-level measure of exposure to conflict in their 
                                                 
10 Patricio Abinales is a professor at the University of Hawaii at Manoa. Data was requested via email. 
11 If there is underreporting of conflict incidents, it will serve to bias our results downward since there will potentially be 
participants who were exposed to conflict that we do not account for. 
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hometown. Using this data, we tag 120 of our participants as having been exposed to conflict in 
their hometown before migrating to Metro Manila. In Table A.12, we summarize the 
characteristics of the conflicts to which our subjects were exposed. Over the course of their stay 
in hometowns that experienced conflict incidents, subjects were exposed to 4 Muslim-rooted 
conflict incidents. More than 1 in 2 subjects were exposed to a communist conflict incident. 
These conflict incidents were deadly, and casualties include civilians in addition to the armed 
groups participating in the conflict. 
4.3.3 Empirical Strategy 
Our empirical strategy relies on the quasi-random nature of the timing and location of conflict 
incidents. We examine the difference in preferences between individuals whose hometowns had 
at least one conflict incident before they migrated to Metro Manila, and individuals whose 
hometowns did not experience a conflict incident. In doing this, the underlying assumption is 
that town-level exposure to conflict was orthogonal to individual preferences. Given the nature 
of our data, there are two potential sources of bias: 1) selective migration to Metro Manila, and 
2) communities were targeted by the groups involved in the conflicts. We deal with these by 
focusing on participants who migrated to Metro Manila, and by accounting for hometown-level 
characteristics that may be associated with conflict incidence. We also show that our estimates 
are robust to accounting for a wide range of controls for individual, conflict, and hometown 
characteristics. 
 Our results are based on estimating cross-section models of the following form, 
 
i 1 i 2 i 3 i i 4 i i
5 i i 6 7 i
outcome =α+β conflict +β muslim +β (conflict *muslim )+β (muslimconflict *muslim )
+β (communistconflict *muslim )+β muslimconflict +β communistconflict +εi i
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where outcomei can take one of three forms: 1) religious in-group bias, as measured by the 
difference in the amounts sent in dictator games 1 and 2, 2) amount sent in dictator game 1, and 
3) amount sent in dictator game 2. Separately estimating the effect of conflict on the dictator 
games allows us to determine whether the effect on religious in-group bias is driven by senders 
being biased in favor of or against members of the same religion. We also include indicators for 
whether subjects are Muslim and whether they were exposed to conflict. We also break down 
conflict exposure by type of conflict. In doing so, we are mainly interested in estimating 4β and 
5β , which decomposes the effect of conflict by the interaction between identity and the type of 
conflict the subject was exposed to. All specifications include controls for session characteristics, 
and standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust. In other specifications, we also include controls 
for hometown-level characteristics, individual-level characteristics, and conflict characteristics. 
That our estimates do not significantly change when we include each of these sets of controls in 
turn alleviates concerns of omitted variable bias. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Selection and Exogeneity 
We assess the plausibility of our assumptions by examining Figure A. 11 shows that individuals 
who come from towns that experienced conflict do not appear to have all migrated to Metro 
Manila right after the initial conflict incident. Rather, some people migrate years after the first 
incident, and even years after the last conflict incident. It is possible that they migrate for reasons 
other than conflict exposure.  
 Table A.13 shows the estimated differences in observable characteristics between towns 
that experienced conflict compared to towns that did not. We only have data on population, land 
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area, poverty incidence, as well as road density in cities. Table A.13 shows that hometowns 
where conflict incidents occurred appear similar to hometowns where no conflict incidents 
occurred. Ex ante, we would expect this since towns in the Philippines cover only a small land 
area, so where exactly conflict occurs is likely to be as good as random.  
Similarly, Table A.14 shows the estimated differences in observable characteristics 
between individuals who migrated to Manila, separately by whether they come from towns that 
experienced conflict compared to towns that did not. We do observe significantly more males in 
the exposed to conflict group. Because most of our sample consists of migrants to Metro Manila, 
this raises the concern that males are more likely to be driven to migrate as a result of conflict in 
the community. Nevertheless, we control for these observable town-level and individual-level 
characteristics and show that accounting for potential differences does not change our results. 
4.4.2 Effect of Conflict Exposure on In-group Bias 
It is helpful to first examine the pattern of giving in the dictator game. One focal point we 
observe in our data is that dictators split the pie equally between the two players. Figure A. 12 
shows the fraction of dictators choosing the equal split, by the religion of the recipient and then 
by conflict exposure. We observe that the fraction of dictators choosing the equal split appears to 
be bigger whenever partners are of the same religion and dictators were not exposed to conflict. 
However, dictators who are exposed to conflict appear to be less likely to choose the equal split 
when partnered with a member of the same religion. 
 Estimation results are shown in Tables A. 15 and A. 16. Table A.15 presents the effect of 
conflict exposure on religious in-group bias, as measured by the difference between the amounts 
sent in dictator games 1 and 2. In Columns 1 and 2, we only examine the effect of any conflict 
exposure. This is typically what previous work in this area are able to estimate, because they 
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only observe one type of conflict in their setting. When we do this, we find that conflict exposure 
results in a decrease in religious in-group bias. Column 2 shows that this result is robust to 
including controls for individual characteristics. In Columns 3 to 6, we separate the effect of the 
two types of conflict and allow for their effects to vary with the religious identity of the sender. 
We find that the type of conflict affects the direction of the effect on in-group bias. Column 3 
shows that Muslims exposed to the Muslim separatist conflict reduce in-group bias, as measured 
by a decrease of 110 pesos in the difference between amounts sent in dictator games 1 and 2. On 
the other hand, Muslims exposed to the communist conflict increase their religious in-group bias, 
as measured by an increase of 72 pesos in the difference between amounts sent in dictator games 
1 and 2. In Columns 4 to 6, respectively, we show that the direction of these effects are robust to 
the inclusion of controls for individual characteristics (age, education, marital status), conflict 
characteristics (civilian and armed group casualties), and hometown characteristics (population 
density, land area and poverty incidence). While these estimates are not large, it may be because 
we construct our dependent variable as the difference between two decisions that subjects make. 
If conflict exposure affects the amount sent in both dictator games 1 and 2 in the same direction, 
then the estimates presented in Table A.15 are possibly attenuated. This is possible if conflict 
exposure makes subjects less inclined to split the money, but more so depending on the 
interaction between the nature of the conflict and the identity of the partner. 
We investigate this possibility in Table A.16. We estimate the effect of conflict exposure 
separately on the amounts sent in dictator game 1 (Panel A) and dictator game 2 (Panel B). We 
use the same specifications, and we find a similar pattern of results across specifications. In 
Columns 1 and 2, when we only measure the effect of general conflict exposure, we find that it 
decreases religious in-group bias. In Columns 3 to 6, when we account for the two types of 
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conflict and interact them with religious identity, we find that Muslims exposed to religious 
conflict decrease the amount they send regardless of the partner. However, comparing the same 
columns between Panel A and Panel B, the estimated reduction is greater when their partner is 
also Muslim. Panel A shows that even when accounting for individual, hometown, and conflict 
characteristics at the same time, we estimate that Muslims exposed to the religious conflict 
decrease the amount sent to a Muslim partner by at least 275 pesos. Notably, our estimates are all 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. By comparison, Panel B shows that the effect of the 
same type of conflict when the partner is not of the same religion is in the same direction, but 
much smaller in magnitude. Our largest estimate is a reduction of 185 pesos. Taken together, the 
results in Panel A and B suggest that the effect of religious conflict on religious in-group bias 
presented in Table A.15 is driven more by a reduction in the degree to which Muslims are biased 
in favor of fellow Muslims, instead of a decrease in their bias against Christians.  
On the other hand, Columns 3 to 6 in Panel A of Table A.16 show that Muslims exposed to 
the indiscriminate communist conflict favor fellow Muslims more. Our most conservative 
estimate is that Muslims exposed to the indiscriminate communist conflict increase the amount 
they send to a Muslim partner by 157 pesos. Again, these estimates are all statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level. Estimates from the same specifications presented in Panel B show again 
that the effect on the amount sent to a Christian partner is comparatively weaker, and none of our 
estimates are statistically different from zero. This pattern of results suggests that the effect of 
indiscriminate conflict presented in Table A.15 is driven by an increase in the degree to which 
Muslims favor fellow Muslims. 
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4.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
The question we investigate in this section is whether the effect of conflict exposure is mediated 
by the interaction between the type of conflict and identity. The Philippines presents a unique 
opportunity to test this hypothesis because of the presence of two ongoing types of conflict: a 
religious conflict and an indiscriminate conflict, as well as the existence of two big groups: 
Christians and Muslims. The combination of these allows us to interact the two types of conflict 
with the two dominant identities. Our findings indicate that these interactions yield opposing 
effects. Being exposed to the indiscriminate conflict leads Muslims to favor fellow Muslims, 
which is the modal result in previous studies. However, being exposed to the religious conflict 
leads Muslims to become more biased against other Muslims. Because the main difference is the 
type of conflict exposure, we are able to conclude that it is being targeted by one’s in-group that 
leads to the puzzling effect on in-group bias. In doing so, we reconcile seemingly contradictory 
findings in the literature, where some studies find that conflict exposure leads to bias against the 
in-group while most other studies find that conflict exposure leads to greater in-group favoritism. 
While we are limited in that our participants appear to have migrated from conflict/non-conflict 
areas at different rates based on gender, to our findings are quantitatively unchanged when we 
allow for these differences. 
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The three essays presented in this dissertation present evidence on the relationship 
between public institutions and economic behavior. Section 1 shows that automating elections 
can reduce election fraud regardless of the pre-existing level of election fraud. More importantly, 
I show that this also resulted in improved government performance, as implied by an increase in 
building permits over time in the previously high-fraud towns relative to the low-fraud towns. In 
Section 2, I show that politicians evacuate a higher fraction of their affected population to 
prepare for tropical cyclones when they face pressure from upcoming elections. Since the 
resources needed to evacuate their population are provided by the national government, my 
results can be interpreted evidence of increased effort by politicians in response to electoral 
pressure. Finally, Section 3 presents evidence that conflict exposure affects religious in-group 
bias. That is, Muslims exposed to inter-religious conflict become biased against other Muslims, 
while Muslims exposed to indiscriminate conflict become biased against Christians.  
Because these essays focus on the Philippine setting, the findings are particularly relevant 
to the developing country experience. Weak electoral institutions and civil conflicts are problems 
that plague many developing countries. The first two sections together show how strengthening 
elections can incentivize politicians to improve their performance at economically important 
aspects of their jobs. The last section implies that recovery efforts following conflict may benefit 
from the taking into account both the type of conflict exposure as well as the identities of the 
groups involved. 
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APPENDIX  
FIGURES AND TABLES 
A.1 Election Fraud 
Figure A. 1. Kernel Density of the Amount of Time it Takes to Get a Building Permit, by 
Whether or not a Firm is Asked for a Bribe 
 
Notes: These graphs show the difference in the time it takes to obtain approval for a building permit depending on 
whether or not a firm is asked for bribes. The unit of observation is an individual firm. Waiting time is measured in 
log days, and are demeaned by the sector-year average waiting times. 
Source of data: World Bank Enterprise Survey of the Philippines in 2009 and 2015. 
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Figure A. 2. Map of the Philippines, with Consistent Election Hotspots Highlighted 
 
 
Notes: This map shows the municipality-level boundaries in the Philippines. The shaded areas represent the towns 
that were consistently identified as election hotspots in 2001, 2004, and 2007. The Philippine National Police 
identifies towns as election hotspots ahead of each election. A town is declared an election hotspot if both of the 
following are true: 1) history of politically motivated incidents; and 2) presence of threat groups (rebel groups or 
private armies affiliated with politicians). 
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Figure A. 3. Distribution of Last Digits of Vote Totals From Mayoral Races, Manual Election 
Period vs Automated Election Period 
A. Consistent Election Hotspot Towns. 
 
B. Other towns 
 
Notes: Each discrete distribution is tested against the predicted last digit frequencies from a uniform distribution. The manual election 
histograms show last digits of vote totals for mayoral elections in 2001, 2004, and 2007. The automated election histograms show data from 
the 2010 and 2013 mayoral elections. Both hotspots and non-hotspots exhibit non-uniform distributions of last digits in the pre-2010 period, 
however results from a Mann-Whitney test rejects the null hypothesis that the two samples are drawn from the same population. In the 
automated election period, both groups of towns last digit distributions that are indistinguishable from a uniform distribution. 
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Figure A. 4. Log of Total Building Permits Approved, Years 2006 – 2015, by Hotspot Incidence 
 
Notes: The graph shows the time series plot of the log of total building permits approved. The blue unbroken line is 
for hotspot towns while the red dashed line is for the other towns. The vertical line between 2009 and 2010 
represents the shift in election systems. The 2010 elections were held in May, with winning candidates taking office 
in June 2010. 
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Figure A. 5. Estimated Divergence in Building Permits Before and After the Shift to Automated 
Elections Between Hotspots and Other Towns, Relative to Three or More Years Before 
 
 
Notes: The graph shows the estimated difference over the period 2008-2015 between building permits 
approved in hotspots and non-hotspots, relative to the difference in the first two years of the data. The 
estimates come from a regression that allows for dynamic effects, and includes indicators for town and 
year fixed effects as well as region-by-year fixed effects. 
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Table A. 1. Number of Procedures and Waiting Time Needed to Obtain a Building Permit in 
Twenty Sampled Cities in the Philippines in 2008 and 2011 
  2008   2011 
  
Number  
of Procedures 
Waiting time  
(in days)   
Number  
of Procedures 
Waiting time  
(in days) 
Caloocan 29 135   31 109 
Cebu 31 83   36 92 
Davao 28 60   27 57 
Lapu-Lapu 32 90   34 88 
Las Piñas 25 134   27 102 
Makati 25 125   26 90 
Malabon 29 155   32 112 
Mandaluyong 29 155   33 121 
Mandaue 33 70   35 72 
Manila 24 203   26 169 
Marikina 25 121   28 91 
Muntinlupa 30 141   31 108 
Navotas 27 145   28 107 
Parañaque 31 137   30 107 
Pasay 27 161   31 121 
Pasig 33 173   36 148 
Quezon City 28 141   33 120 
San Juan 31 175   33 144 
Taguig 23 121   25 85 
Valenzuela 25 123   28 91 
Average 28.25 132.4   30.5 106.7 
Notes: The unit of observation is a city (twenty cities were sampled by the World Bank). The average waiting time 
decreased significantly, by almost 26 days, between 2008 and 2011 (p= 0.01). On the other hand, the number of 
procedures increased by 2 procedures (p= 0.04). 
Source: World Bank Doing Business Reports, 2008 and 2011. 
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Table A. 2.  The Relationship Between Being Asked for a Bribe and the Waiting Time for 
Approval of Building Permit in the Philippines 
 Dependent variable: Log (1+ days to get building permit) 
Panel A: All firms 
    (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5) 
 
Firm is asked for bribe 0.624*** 0.622*** 0.462** 0.452** 0.428** 
 
(0.159) (0.160) (0.200) (0.195) (0.196) 
      
Observations 173 173 119 117 105 
Panel B: Subset of firms for which data on all variables are available 
    (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5) 
 
Firm is asked for bribe 0.335* 0.331 0.433** 0.431** 0.428** 
 
(0.199) (0.223) (0.204) (0.206) (0.196) 
      
Observations 105 105 105 105 105 
Sector fixed effects   x x x x 
Controls for firm and managerial characteristics 
 
 
x x x 
Control for worker productivity 
 
  
x x 
Controls for firm visibility and interaction with government officials        
x 
Notes:  Each column in each panel represents a separate regression. The unit of observation is an individual firm in 
the World Bank Enterprise Survey. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust.  
* Significant at the 10% level  
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level  
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Table A. 3. Descriptive Statistics for Municipalities, by Historical Election Fraud Incidence 
  All municipalities High-fraud towns Low-fraud towns 
Log(number of building permits) 1.85 1.67 1.91 
 
(1.97) (1.82) (2.01) 
Log(value of building permits) 5.53 5.32 5.61 
 
(5.00) (4.89) (5.03) 
Observations 7070 1760 5310 
Notes: Each cell contains the mean with the standard deviation in parentheses. The unit of 
observation is a municipality in a given year. The time period is 2006-2015. 
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Table A. 4. The Effect of Reducing Election Fraud on the Total Number of Building Permits 
That Get Approved 
 
Dependent variable:  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log(number of building permits) 
            
Hotspot*automated election 0.166** 0.166** 0.149** 0.145** 0.167** 
  (0.0706) (0.0706) (0.0665) (0.0737) (0.082) 
            
Hotspot*year before automated 
election 
      -0.0163   
        (0.0657)   
            
Observations 7070 7070 7070 7070 7070 
Town and year fixed effects x x x x x 
Control for population   x x x x 
Region-by-year fixed effects     x x x 
Town-specific time trends         x 
Notes:  Each column represents a separate regression. The unit of observation is town-year. Robust standard errors 
are clustered at the town level.  
* Significant at the 10% level  
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level  
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Table A. 5. The Effect of Reducing Election Fraud on the Probability That Incumbent 
Candidates are Re-elected 
 
        
Dependent variable: Incumbent win rate         (1)         (2)                                                 (3) (4)
Hotspot*automated election 0.00457 -0.0171 -0.0581 0.00501 
  (0.0602) (0.0622) (0.0640) (0.0701) 
  
    Year before automated elections 
  
-0.0971 
   
  
(0.0846) 
   
    Observations 4057 4057 4057 4057 
Town fixed effects x x x x 
Region-by-year fixed effects 
 
x x x 
Province-specific time trends 
   
x 
Notes:  Each column represents a separate regression. The unit of observation is town-year. Year 2001 is held out 
because it is used as the reference point for determining incumbents, so the election years included are 2004, 2007, 
2010, and 2013. Robust standard errors are clustered at the town level.  
* Significant at the 10% level  
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level  
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Table A. 6. The Effect of Reducing Election Fraud on Incumbent Candidates’ Victory Margins 
 
Dependent variable: Incumbent victory margin (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Hotspot*automated election -0.102* -0.0967* -0.118** -0.125 
  (0.0513) (0.0553) (0.0541) (0.437) 
          
Election year before automated elections     -0.0589   
      (0.0824)   
          
Observations 2882 2882 2882 2882 
Town fixed effects x x x x 
Region-by-year fixed effects   x x x 
Town-specific time trends       x 
Notes:  Each column represents a separate regression. The unit of observation is candidate-year. A candidate’s 
victory margin is calculated by taking the difference between their vote share and the vote share received by the 
candidate with the second-highest number of votes. Year 2001 is held out because it is used as the reference point 
for determining incumbents, so the election years included are 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2013. Robust standard errors 
are clustered at the town level.  
* Significant at the 10% level  
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level  
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A.2 Tropical Cyclone Evacuations 
Figure A. 6. How the Evacuation Process Works in the Philippines 
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Figure A. 7. Fraction of Affected Population Evacuated, by Term of Governor and Time to the 
Next Election 
 
Notes: This figure shows the variation in the fraction of the affected population evacuated annually, by term and by 
proximity to the next election. Evacuations increase in the final year of both first and second term governors, while 
no change is observed for the third term governors.  
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Table A. 7. Breakdown of Governors 
 
Total number of governors 146   
Number of consecutive terms achieved:     
1 56   
2 43   
3 47   
                 Ran for other provincial office: 21 
                                Vice-Governor   2 
                               Congress   17 
                               Provincial Board   2 
Notes: The above table shows how many unique governors are in the data, broken down by the highest 
number of consecutive terms they achieved. The table also shows how many of the termed-out 
incumbents seek election to a different provincial office. 
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Table A. 8. Summary Statistics, by Term of Governor 
 
Panel A. Breakdown of province-years by term of governor     
Governor is in: Frequency Percent     
1st term 332 51.88     
2nd term 185 28.91     
3rd term 123 19.22     
          
Panel B. Summary statistics         
Annual Averages: Number of storms Total Evacuated Total Dead Total Affected 
All terms 2.19 39810 17 120309 
  (1.40) (119090) (214) (297947) 
Gov. is in 1st term 2.15 31670 20 109838 
  (1.43) (105851) (288) (319506) 
Gov. is in 2nd term 2.30 52415 16 140789.5 
  (1.32) (137539) (76) (294947) 
Gov. is in 3rd term 2.12 42823 9 97226 
  (1.41) (122162) (62) (206233) 
 
Notes: Above is a summary of the combined typhoons-elections data, where the detailed data on typhoons is 
annualized to form a balanced panel of provinces across time. Standard deviation in parentheses. 
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Table A. 9. The Effect of Increased Electoral Pressure on the Number of Evacuees 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Eligible to run for re-
election*approaching end 
of term 
0.232** 0.225** 0.227** 0.204* 0.219* 0.201 
(0.109) (0.109) (0.112) (0.119) (0.112) (0.120)   
            
  
            
Observations 472 472 472 472 472 472 
Province and year FE x x x x x x 
Control for HH population x     x x 
Control for distance of storms   x   x x 
Governor FE       x   x 
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. The unit of observation is province-year. The time period 
spans the years 2007-2014. Robust standard errors are clustered at the province level.  
* Significant at the 10% level  
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level  
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Table A. 10. The Effect of Increased Electoral Pressure on Number of Evacuees, Varying the Cutoff 
 
Dependent variable: evacuation rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)    (6) (7)    (8) (9) (10) 
Months before end of term: 20 months 19 months 18 months 16 months 14 months 13 months 12 months 11 months 10 months 9 months 
Eligible to run for re-
election*approaching end of term 
0.129 0.131 0.186* 0.187* 0.189* 0.222** 0.232** 0.189* 0.247** 0.198* 
(0.109) (0.107) (0.104) (0.104) (0.105) (0.109) (0.109) (0.0969) (0.110) (0.106) 
                    
Observations 472 472 472 472 472 472 472 472 472 472 
Robust standard errors clustered at the province level                 
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. The unit of observation is province-year. The time period spans the years 2007-2014. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the province level.  
* Significant at the 10% level  
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level  
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A.3 Conflict 
Figure A. 8. Towns in the Philippines with at Least One Conflict Incident, 1977-2016 
 
 
 
 
 
Source of data: Combined Uppsala Conflict Data Program and the Abinales-Reyes data. 
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Figure A. 9. Number of Conflict Incidents Every Year, 1977-2016 
 
Notes: This data shows the evolution of conflict incidents over time. Conflict peaks in the late 1980s to early 1990s, 
and then again beginning in the early 21st century. 
Source of data: Combined Uppsala Conflict Data Program and the Abinales-Reyes data. 
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Figure A. 10. Sample Dictator Game Task Page for Subject who is Muslim and Maranao, 
English Translation 
 
Notes: The above is a translated version of the decision page from the booklet that is given to participants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 76 
 
Figure A. 11. Distribution of Subjects by Timing of Migration Relative to Conflict Exposure 
 
Panel A. Year Migrated vs Year of First Conflict. 
 
 
Panel B. Year Migrated vs Year of Last Conflict. 
 
 
 
Notes: The above graphs show a histogram of participants by the years lapsed since the first conflict (Panel A) and 
the second conflict (Panel B). 
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Figure A. 12. Fraction of Participants Choosing to Split Equally, by Religion of Partner and 
Conflict Exposure 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows the fraction of participants choosing to split the Php 500 equally between them and their 
partner, separately for the identity of their partner and by conflict exposure. 
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Table A. 11. Number of Participants in Each Session 
 
Session Location Type Ramadan 
Number of 
participants 
1 Taguig 
Pure 
Muslim Yes 22 
2 Taguig 
Pure 
Muslim Yes 26 
3 Taguig Mixed Yes 24 
4 Taguig Mixed Yes 20 
5 Taguig 
Pure 
Christian Yes 20 
6 Culiat 
Pure 
Muslim Yes 15 
7 Culiat 
Pure 
Muslim Yes 20 
8 Culiat Mixed Yes 25 
9 Culiat Mixed Yes 24 
10 Culiat 
Pure 
Christian No 20 
11 Greenhills 
Pure 
Muslim No 17 
12 Greenhills 
Pure 
Muslim No 15 
13 Greenhills Mixed No 20 
14 Greenhills Mixed No 22 
15 Greenhills 
Pure 
Muslim No 8 
16 Greenhills 
Pure 
Christian No 18 
17 Taguig 
Pure 
Muslim No 12 
      TOTAL 328 
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Table A. 12. Summary Statistics (Average Per Subject Exposed to Conflict) 
Civilian casualties 5.82 
  (5.64) 
Government casualties 3.08 
  (5.29) 
Communist conflict 
incidents 0.59 
  (2.35) 
Muslim conflict incidents 3.64 
  (5.42) 
Conflict incidents 4.42 
  (6.17) 
Observations 120 
Notes: This table presents the subject-level average on each conflict characteristic that we have data on. The 
Abinales-Reyes data do not have these variables. 
Source of data: Uppsala Conflict Data Program. 
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Table A. 13. Summary Statistics of Hometowns, by Conflict Incidence 
 
  No conflict Conflict p-value 
Land area 313.4074 432.4135 0.2596 
  (54.5177) (100.8331)   
Population density in 2000 695.0031 437.3908 0.4700 
  (220.9424) (100.6478)   
Population density in 1995 780.2941 508.1743 0.4584 
  (250.7943) (115.5898)   
Population density in 1990 853.0722 563.8938 0.4700 
  (273.3394) (128.1075)   
Poverty incidence 0.3965 0.4269 0.5084 
  (0.0260) (0.0389)   
Observations 50 26   
Road density (cities) 2.2 0.5618 0.1348 
  (0.7827) (0.2022)   
Observations 8 5   
Notes: This table shows the means on the hometown-level observable characteristics by conflict incidence. The last 
column shows the p-value from a hypothesis test of whether no conflict and conflict towns are different on each 
characteristic. 
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Table A. 14. Individual Characteristics, by Conflict Incidence 
 
  No conflict Conflict p-value 
College 0.43 0.53 0.1932 
  (0.06) (0.05)   
Married 0.56 0.47 0.22 
  (0.06) (0.05)   
Male 0.35 0.58 0.002 
  (0.05) (0.5)   
Observations 79 120   
Notes: This table shows the means on the individual-level observable characteristics by conflict incidence, for 
migrants to Manila. The last column shows the p-value from a hypothesis test of whether individuals from no 
conflict and conflict towns are different on each characteristic. 
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Table A. 15. Effect of Conflict Exposure on Religious In-Group Bias 
 
Dependent Variable: Difference in Amounts Sent in Dictator Games 1 and 2  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       Experienced conflict -62.38*** -63.57*** 72.00 94.31* 57.37 68.01 
 
(21.39) (21.60) (52.30) (52.37) (51.41) (56.64) 
       Muslim and experienced 
  
-110.0* -116.0* -123.1* -123.6* 
 muslim conflict 
  
(65.01) (67.03) (71.55) (69.97) 
       Muslim and experienced 
  
71.61 99.95* 74.09 69.93 
 communist conflict 
  
(54.58) (55.66) (70.30) (72.18) 
       Observations 188 188 188 188 188 187 
Controls for religion and 
x x x x x x 
             exposure to conflict 
Controls for session characteristics x x x x x x 
Controls for individual characteristics 
 
x 
 
x x x 
Controls for conflict characteristics 
    
x x 
Controls for hometown characteristics           x 
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. The unit of observation is town-year. Robust standard errors 
are clustered at the town level. 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
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Table A. 16. Effect of Conflict Exposure on Giving to Religious In-Group (Out-Group) 
 
Panel A. Dependent Variable: Amount Sent in Dictator Game 1 (Religious In-Group) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       Experienced conflict -44.48 -50.36 133.6** 170.2*** 157.1** 141.4** 
 
(29.81) (30.96) (58.44) (53.20) (64.41) (67.30) 
       Muslim and experienced 
  
-290.8*** -301.8*** -290.3*** -276.7*** 
 muslim conflict 
  
(67.02) (62.59) (69.26) (75.33) 
       Muslim and experienced 
  
157.2*** 198.6*** 194.1*** 204.7*** 
 communist conflict 
  
(50.86) (52.05) (64.44) (65.80) 
       Observations 188 188 188 188 188 187 
Controls for religion and 
x x x x x x 
             exposure to conflict 
Controls for session characteristics x x x x x x 
Controls for individual characteristics 
 
x 
 
x x x 
Controls for conflict characteristics 
    
x x 
Controls for hometown characteristics           x 
       Panel B. Dependent Variable: Amount Sent in Dictator Game 2 (Religious Out-Group) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       Experienced conflict 17.90 13.21 61.60 75.91 99.72 73.39 
 
(29.05) (27.74) (89.63) (75.16) (78.01) (81.13) 
       Muslim and experienced 
  
-180.8* -185.9** -167.2* -153.2 
 muslim conflict 
  
(104.3) (90.53) (98.06) (97.38) 
       Muslim and experienced 
  
85.60 98.62 120.0 134.8 
 communist conflict 
  
(87.72) (77.11) (92.64) (90.40) 
       Observations 188 188 188 188 188 187 
Controls for religion and 
x x x x x x 
             exposure to conflict 
Controls for session characteristics x x x x x x 
Controls for individual characteristics 
 
x 
 
x x x 
Controls for conflict characteristics 
    
x x 
Controls for hometown characteristics           x 
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. The unit of observation is town-year. Robust standard errors 
are clustered at the town level. 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
